Leaders and strategists at Davos 2026 explore how shifting power dynamics among major regions could reshape global cooperation and influence in the decades ahead.
Finland’s President Alexander Stubb argued that 2025–26 is a “hinge moment” akin to 1918, 1945, or 1989, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a more transactional United States accelerating the breakdown of the post–Cold War order. In his “triangle of power” framework, the Global West, Global East (led by China), and the Global South will shape what comes next—either multipolar “transaction and deals…spheres of interest” or rules-based multilateralism. To preserve liberal order, Stubb said the West must “give agency” to non-Western states and practice “dignified foreign policy,” treating partners with respect.
On Greenland, he described a successful playbook of “escalate to de-escalate” combined with “frenetic diplomacy,” while warning sovereignty norms were still damaged. On Ukraine, he rejected the narrative that Kyiv is losing, citing Russian strategic failures (NATO enlargement, Europe’s rearmament) and high Russian costs; pressure and support are prerequisites for a deal, not alternatives to one.
For Europe, Stubb urged pragmatism with Washington—cooperate where possible, disagree where necessary—and predicted pressure from Russia and the US will drive deeper EU integration, flexible enlargement for Ukraine, and broader economic hedging.
Hello. A very warm welcome to this session. My name is Mark Leonard. I'm director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, and it's a huge thrill to be moderating this session today. It's true that Finland may be a small country, but Alex Stubb is a political giant and he's got a pretty unique profile in international politics. It's not just that they're not that many iron men, who, the international, diplomatic table, but, he's also a remarkable, scholar as well as a statesman. He served as Finland's prime minister, finance minister, foreign minister, and since 2020, for its president. And over the years, he's been involved in these different roles in practically every European crisis since 2008. And more recently, he's been in the headlines quite a bit as one of the main Trump whisperers, in Europe with his, pictures of him playing golf with the president of the United States and some of his messages, and being reprinted in international, media. And, so we're going to talk about a lot of those things, but we're also going to take a step back from the day to day politics. And Alex is also the author of a fascinating new book, much recommended to everyone, called The Triangle of Power, which looks at some of these big seismic changes which are taking place to global order behind the headlines. So, today we're going to try and both look at the some of the short term issues that have been dominating the news. But then to take a step back and, and think about how to operate in a completely different world that we've all been talking about and experiencing over the last few days. Welcome to to this session, Alex. Maybe we should start with that with the big picture and then kind of end with the with the, with the headlines. But, in your book, you talk about how we're living through a hinge moment in history and you compare 2025, 2026 to to other periods where everything changed, like 1918, 1945, 1989. Can you maybe start just by describing where you think we're at and what these structural changes are, which are which are driving a lot of the headlines that we are reading.
Yeah, sure. I mean, in summary, you could say that the big argument is that for us, this is the 1918, 1945 or 1989 moment of our generation. It's a moment when the world order, balance and dynamics are changing. Sometimes they happen after wars, like after World War one, World War two, or someone, sometimes after, periods such as the Cold War. And we're sort of somewhere in between. And we know that orders usually last, or at least have in the past, century, 20 years, as they did after World War one. So 40 years after they did after World War two, or 30 years, as it did after the Cold War. And what initiated the change in the current liberal world order, I would argue, was Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine. So we're talking February 2022. I fully realize that this is a rather Western perspective of looking at things, but I admit fully in the book as well that my identity is, Finnish, Nordic, European, transatlantic. So I look at my analysis, looks a lot through that lens. And of course, it has now been accelerated, this change and transformation with, with the new US administration, and the triangle of power for me is the global West, which used to be led, at least by the United States trying to preserve the current liberal order, the Global East, led by China, which was more supporting Multipolarity and a new order, and then the global South, which unfairly lamp 125 countries into. But for me, that is, the area and entities of the world that will actually decide what the next order looks like. And of course, now things move quite fast. I think the thesis still holds, but my big idea is that you kind of have a choice, which is fairly binary, but probably it's going to land somewhere in between. You have those who support Multipolarity, which is about transaction and deals and actually spheres of interest. So not far from what we saw in the 19th century. And then you have those who support multilateralism, which is about international institutions. It's about rule of law. It's about norms. And basically the liberal world order that existed. And my final point, if we want to preserve the liberal world order, we need to give agency to those countries around the world which feel that the current order was built 80 years ago in the image of the West and especially the United States. So give more power to the rest of the world, because I still think that there are more multilateralism in this world than they are transactionalists. So this this is the big idea of the book. And, in many ways, the defense of of the liberal world order and of course, of open societies as well.
So, it's a it's a really interesting framework for thinking about what's going on. And you are, positioning yourself against the tide of history on a lot of these different areas. You're a liberal in a world where there is a kind of big, political movement against liberalism, which is particularly advanced in advanced democracies like the US and European countries. You're a multilateralist in a world where power politics is increasingly, defining how events take place. And you say that you're proud atlanticist in a world where the meaning of the West is kind of fundamentally changing, how do you find a way of reconciling the world that you want to live in with the one that, you're having to, to operate in on a daily basis?
Yeah. I mean, so, there's one thing I say in the book and I've said out publicly as well, and also in the Foreign Affairs piece, which I published in a little while back. And is that in foreign policy, it's important that you deal with the world that exists, not a world that you would want to exist. And for that framework, I then came up a few years back with this concept of values based realism, which essentially means that you stay true to your values. Democracy in my case, democracy, freedom, human rights, fundamental rights, protecting minorities, rule of law, supporting the international world order. But at the same time, you're realistic that you cannot solve all the world's problems, like conflicts or climate change or AI, only with like minded countries. So you need to come together somewhere in a place, to, to, to, to deal with it. I have to admit that when I crafted values based realism, I wasn't really thinking about having to do it with the United States, but, but but I have to admit that that there is an element of that. So it gives it gives me space. And what it's not a doctrine as such, but it's an instrument to take us over this period of transition. I know Mark Carney talked about rupture, and he might be right. He's a bit.
You've converted Mark Carney, but how do you get beyond.
Kind of the biggest achievement in my life? I mean, my Mark Carney quoting values based realism. But, no, I mean, it's it's kind of the idea is then you have to ask yourself the question, okay, how do you do this? Well, a good starting point in my mind is another instrument I try to outline there, which is dignified foreign policy, because I feel that, you know, we have a lot of conversation about history, about a post-colonial world, about colonialism. And we always look back into history for examples of how we have been treated. So my take, and of course, I come from a rather inoffensive country, with a limited colonial past, which which means that it gives me kind of street cred to do that. So I talk about dignified foreign policy. In other words, you have to behave towards the people that you want to work with in a respectable way, which, seems to be lacking a little bit in the world right now as well, I have to admit.
So we've been through this extraordinary psychodrama over the last couple of weeks, around Greenland. I think without a doubt in my mind, it's the biggest transatlantic crisis that we've seen since the Suez. It looks like, things are kind of being resolved, but I think it is quite important to take some lessons from what's happened over the last period of time. What do you think the main lessons are?
That we live in an unpredictable world, and there will be curveballs coming at you in foreign policy virtually every day. You know, I don't remember a Davos. And I've been here 11 times where in the first 21 days of the year, we've had Venezuela, we've had Ukraine, we've had Greenland, we've had Iran, we've had Gaza, just to name five conflicts that have been tossed around. So, you know, we we just have to take these curveballs one at a time. In the Greenland issue, right in the beginning, when it started, you had two camps. You had those who in Europe who wanted to de-escalate, and then those who wanted to escalate to de-escalate. And I think most of us sort of worked in, in both of these spheres. So we were looking for instruments which would try to tone down the language by threatening escalation on on different types of measures that the European Union has. But the key for me was to look at three possible outcomes or scenarios. One was good, one was bad, and one was ugly. The good one was that we would get an off ramp and then a process which would strengthen Arctic security. A bad one would be an escalation in tariff wars, and an ugly one would be a declaration of a military intervention in Greenland. And I think in the past 3 to 4 days, where we pretty much worked around the clock with Mark Rutte and Jonas and American senators and others, we were able to, to escalate, to de-escalate and end up in zone number one. So, so good outcome. But at the same time, I, you know, I, I can't say that this won't have an effect. Of course it does. Because one of the key principles of, of the international order and how you treat alliances is that you respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each and each and every one of us. But, you know, we we were able to deal with it short term. And now we have to have a look what we come up with long term.
So what do you think the, the short term lesson is that you need a mix of showing that you're serious by filling the vacuum, both militarily with threatening to to use countermeasures.
And frenetic diplomacy. It's just you just have to work the phone and you have to do it behind the scenes.
And in terms of the longer term questions, I mean, you're a very passionate European. You've worked for the EU institutions as well as for your own government. You've been part of this, fundamental transformation of Finnish identity from being a neutral country to being one of the most passionate defenders of European sovereignty and of the EU. What do you think Europeans need to do now in order to to make sure they can be sovereign in this new world that we've been talking about?
The first just general observation is people don't realize this. Finland is actually the only Nordic country, which is 100% EU member in the sense that we are in the.
No opt outs.
Yeah, exactly. You know, we're in the euro and we don't have any derogations. And I think that the original decision for us to join the union in 1995, in a referendum, was based on security, though we didn't want to talk about it at the time. You know, we never wanted to be alone again. So so we did that. And of course, on NATO, which I wish we would have joined much earlier, we ended up joining it also because, you know, Putin, attacked Ukraine. So what what's my advice to my European friends? That is to say that don't throw the baby out with the bathwater. We've been in transatlantic crisis before. You mentioned the Suez Canal. You know, France left NATO. There has actually been, regime change or, elections have changed leaders in Germany because of placement of different types of military equipment in Germany, because of the transatlantic relationship. So, I think be pragmatic, use the values based be true to your own values. So that means that you look for places where you can cooperate with the United States and the current administration. The war in Ukraine is an obvious one. NATO is another one in my case, icebreakers? Probably not in the case of the rest of you. But, we work with the American administration on technology. We work with minerals. But at the same time, you know, we can't do it, naively. You know, we have to be cognizant of the fact that that there is there is a lot of movement in the transatlantic partnership right now. But fortunately, Finland's bilateral relations with the US is is really good. So we are in a in a good place. But when you do that, realize that there are going to be areas where you're simply going to disagree. And you can tell that either publicly, which some people do, or then privately, which I do. So it could be issues linked to, international institutions and American withdrawal from the multilateral system. It could be on us unilateral action. It could be on climate change. It could be on how we defend democracy both at home and abroad. It certainly was on on Greenland, where, you know, you don't have to be an expert on international relations to understand why Finland staunchly supports Denmark and Greenland. So you just have to be open in this relationship. And when you do that, I think there are three levels. One is, of course for me the direct contact with the president. But I have no illusions. I mean, Trump whisperer. Nice. But I mean, you know, I whisper or text and most of the time he doesn't listen. So, you know, so so be realistic about it. Second level is people close to Trump. And the third level is actually the first branch of government, Senate and Congress in general. So you just have to work very pragmatically at it and believe that this transatlantic partnership will survive.
So before we all became experts on Greenland and Greenlandic security, the the biggest European security question was about Ukraine and its future. And that is something which is very much still on the cards. And we hear that Steve Witkoff is going to fly off from Davos to to Moscow.
And Jared Kushner.
And Jared Kushner as well. It's an you know, you've been intimately involved in every single stage of the negotiations and discussions around Ukrainian security. How do you see the situation at the moment?
Well, I think probably two remarks on that, one of the peace process and one of the narrative of the war. So on the peace process, I'm carefully optimistic in the sense that ever since, to be honest, Jared Kushner, came in, the process became much more concrete. So yes, there was a 28 point plan. But if you look at what happened after G20 in three different cities Geneva, Berlin and Paris, in Geneva, we had national security advisers from the US, from Ukraine, and from Europe trying to suss out and bring it down to 20 points. Then in Berlin, we had a number of European leaders, and then Kushner and Witkoff who came to, you know, look at common landing zones. And then in Berlin on the 5th of December, we had a meeting of the coalition of the willing. And in in a broad perspective, I think, you know, we're almost there. So we have pretty much five plus two documents, which have to do with the 20 point plan security guarantees, the prosperity plan, a sequencing plan and a few others. So the good news is that Europe, Ukraine and the United States is on the same page here. Now, my second point is that there seems to be a narrative that Ukraine is losing this war, and I simply don't buy that. And we have enough information and intelligence to to back this up as well. But it's a Russian narrative which has been, also floated a lot in, in, in the US. The first question you have to ask yourself, what were the strategic aims of Putin, number one was to take over Ukraine and make it Russian. Well, Ukraine is going to become a member of the European Union. Number two was to prevent NATO enlargement. Well, Finland and Sweden joined because of Russia's war of aggression. And that basically doubles the border of NATO with Russia. So another failure. The third aim was to avoid the remilitarization of Europe. Now we're spending up to 5% of our GDP on defence expenditure. So from. And on top of that you look at, Russian projection of power in Iran, loss, Syria loss, Venezuela laws, what the United States was able to do in Venezuela in 12 hours in an operation is what the Russian military wanted to do in Ukraine with total failure. So, you know, don't buy into this narrative that Russia is somehow winning this war. And if you look at it from a military perspective, what is going on right now is remarkable. Not only is Ukraine holding fort, the advancement of of Russian forces is less than a percentage point in the past two years. So you know, of territory. So what was acquired was kind of acquired from 2014 to before the war began. I mean, it's really slow war of attrition. And the cost of that is just to Russia. In December, 34,000 dead, dead soldiers. So for what? For claiming that you took Kupiansk when you didn't, and you claim it twice and you didn't twice. So people are saying that Russia wants to continue the war because they want more territory. That's rubbish. Russia has to continue the war because this war is too big for Putin to fail. When you add on to that, that the Russian economy is in shambles, which means they're not going to be able to pay pay their soldiers, which means zero growth, end of reserves, interest rates and inflation in double digits. So Putin cannot afford to end this war. This is my big worry. So what do we need to do? We continue to support Ukraine. We continue to put pressure on Russia. That's the only way in which we can get a deal. This week will be important. There's, Moscow today, and then there'll be Ukrainian, Russian and American, national security advisors or negotiators in the Arab Emirates, for two days after that. So, you know, have faith Ukraine is going to win this war.
So, I want to give people a chance to ask a few questions. But maybe before we can do that, we could just ask you another question about the future of the EU. You were saying that Ukraine will join the European Union. It's definitely one of the points in the 20 points. And there is talk of, of setting a date in the very near future by which Ukraine will join. But there is this paradox that on the one hand, from a security perspective, it's totally necessary and and clear. It's an existential issue to integrate Ukraine into the European Union. But from a political perspective, it's extraordinarily difficult to envisage how it can join in the way that other countries joined. How do you you, unlike any other European leader, you've, extensively in the academic realm on on differentiated integration and thinking about, the EU in a much more complicated way. How do you square those two circles?
Yeah, I guess that's a little bit nerdy. So, I did my PhD on flexible integration. So the concept and idea that not everyone needs to do everything at the same time, and the concept which we've seen throughout the.
Which everyone apart from Finland seems to be using. Exactly.
We're in the core of Europe all the time. So it's in a concept such as multi-speed and variable geometry and a la carte, etc. etc.. So my big thinking here is that, there's nothing that unifies Europe more than pressure. And now that pressure is coming from both the East and the West. And this means that European Union enlargement has become strategic and existential rather than, legalistic and juridical. So we're going to start seeing a more flexible Europe, for instance. I now don't differentiate, even though I'm a member of the European Union, with the work that I do with the United Kingdom and Prime Minister Starmer, or especially the ten conversations I have with the Prime Minister of Norway, every week, or the work that we do with Iceland, even though they're not members of the EU. So then you come to the question of, okay, how do you integrate it into the system? And I think that and I hear I just for everyone in the Finnish Constitution, president does foreign policy and commander in chief, prime minister does the EU. So, I don't want to step on the toes of the Prime Minister here. So I'm not going to give you any dates. But I think what's going to happen is that the union is going to start looking at enlargement, from a different perspective. It's probably going to turn the whole concept of enlargement around. So instead of you negotiating 35 chapters and 100,000 pages of a key communautaire, you are granted membership, and then you start getting the rights of that membership as you close these chapters. And I think that could be a way out for Ukraine. I'm not saying it's going to be easy because, you know, Ukraine has, what, over 40,000 inhabitants, the agricultural market is, is bigger than all of Europe combined. But at the same time, it has 800,000 men and women in the military. So I think when Ukraine joins the European Union, the military power of the European Union is basically going to double or triple overnight. So it has a lot of issues, but then there are going to be issues about countries organizing referendum about enlargement and things like that. So it's not going to be easy. But enlargement is always it's about three things. It's about well absorption on three things. One is institutions can they absorb two is budget, can it be absorbed. And three is policies. Can it be absorbed. But I think it would be, a travesty and strategic geopolitical mistake if Ukraine were not members of the European Union.
And what do you think the implications will be for other countries outside the EU like the UK? Norway?
Well, as I've said, Mark about the UK is that took you seven years to to negotiate yourself out of the EU. It'll take you seven years to regret it and then seven years to negotiate yourselves back in.
Okay. We got time for a couple of questions before we end. If people could make them short and, and introduce themselves first. Sorry. Oh, comfort. Yes.
Comfort is in the room. No. Comfort is in the room. Comfort? That's the first question.
Thank you very much, Madam President. And, Mark, I think the other lesson I would add to your list, and president, is that it does matter to have somebody from one of the Western countries to, to to put very clearly on the table, like you have done and you've brought Mark Carney to do that with you to recognize the rupture. Because without that, then the rest of the world and what the rest of the world, has been saying doesn't land until one of you accompany that message. Mark asked you what that looked like in practice, and you referred to a more dignified foreign policy. But can I push you a little bit further within the context of Sudan and Myanmar and Haiti? What does that what does that actually look like in practical terms as well? And I don't want to look back in history, but I think a number of the rest of the world were very concerned about the, the variations of silence over Venezuela. And you've just underlined the core principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as well. The challenge was that not everybody also supports Maduro. That's the challenge. But nonetheless, the principle still holds.
Thank you. Yeah, okay. And it's super good question. And thank you for all the reports that you and your team write in the crisis group. I try to read as many of them as I possibly can. I think that three examples that you brought forward, Sudan, Myanmar and Haiti are examples of what happens when, we are focused on other crises, whether it's on Venezuela, whether it's on Ukraine, whether it's on Greenland, whether it's on, on, on Iran or whether it's on Gaza. And I try to and I raise in the book, not only in the part where I talk about the global South. I mean, how can we not talk about Sudan, which is basically probably the most atrocious, atrocious, conflict that we have. Myanmar completely forgotten. And we're talking about a country of, what, 50, 55 million people where over half are now living in poverty and there's no such thing as human rights, fundamental rights, being there and Haiti, same thing. I personally find that I try to deal with as many conflicts as I possibly can, but in my mind, in foreign policy, there are things that I can say which will be based on my values. And then there are things and conflicts where I can do, like for instance, on Ukraine. So I try to, you know, pick my battles. But but there's a legitimate claim on that on Venezuela. Complicated because on one hand there is the element of breaking international law. I mean, you just can't go in and remove a leader. On the other hand, you're going well, removing Maduro is a legitimate leader, you know, so it's extremely complicated. And I have to admit that in this particular case, I think values based realism is a wonderful tool.
Have we got time for one, 1 or 2 more? Okay.
Okay. Thank you very much. I'm sure the journalist from China's media, and I would like to ask a question about your invasion, about the.
Book needs to be translated into Chinese.
Yeah, but I won't focus on the European political atmosphere ahead, because for the for the drama that you have mentioned for the past 21 days, it should be like a wake up call for European and the so-called European strategic autonomy. But would you worry that, in the, in the years ahead, maybe the rising populism or the isolationist emotion across Europe might taking part or might take apart the foundation for the European unity or the foundation for calling for further integration and strategic autonomy in Europe. And another follow up question is.
Just I think we're almost out of time. Do you want to answer that?
Yeah. I think first of all, I mean, I'll give it Telegraphically. I do think that the pressure that we are now seeing coming from the United States and also coming from Russia will actually lead to deeper integration, probably more strategic autonomy or whatever you want to call it, and however you want to define it, and also to an enlarged Europe. But there's another thing that it will lead to and that is Europe looking also elsewhere. So we're kind of hedging or de-risking a little bit. Like Mark Carney said in his speech. You know, Canada is 70% dependent on trade with the US. We are not in that situation. But we used to talk about de-risking from China. I don't hear that too much anymore, if you know what I'm saying. We're talking about de-risking elsewhere, which is an interesting phenomenon in all of this. And I think, you know, Europe is doing the right geopolitical thing, a deal with Mercosur. I won't have issue with what the European Parliament decided on that yesterday, but nevertheless, moving on or a free trade agreement with India. So you're going to start seeing Europe and other players. So this is in very many ways I believe it is Europe's moment. And you are going to start seeing that. And I think we can cope with it fairly well. I just one final point. Europe used to be considered to be slow and legislative and bureaucratic and regulatory, way too stable. And right now people are looking for stability. So I actually think that a lot of investment will start coming into Europe as well. I mean, I'm talking about the EU, EU, US thing. So I'm actually quite optimistic about the future of Europe because of Covid, because of Ukraine, because of energy, because of the US.
Okay, so we got one final question. This gentleman here.
Good afternoon and Namaskar. I'm Ishan Pratap Singh from the Global Shapers New Delhi hub. I'm a 22 year old who studied economics, entrepreneurship and international relations. My question to you is, could you tell me, to the point you mentioned to your mind, in navigating diplomacy, what is the utility of because you said it's better if you call again and if you do it in private. So what's the utility of doing, anything in public? And how has it been for you navigating it? And how have you been able to develop the skills to navigate this so well when, it's a complicated environment to do.
Sure. Well, I mean, just to frame it, I think in foreign policy you have values, interests and power and smaller players like myself. We have values and interests, but power becomes influence. And that's where diplomacy comes in. And I think we look at diplomacy and we should look at diplomacy based on two pillars. One pillar is your traditional state to state relations. You know, what is the relationship between Finland and India? You know, values, interests, power, geography, history, culture. So that's one part state to state, very formal. The other part is personal. What kind of relationship do I have with the president of the United States or the, the prime minister of, of of of India? And then I, as a president, have to make the judgment. What are the things I want to say out in the public? And what are the things that I can deal with in private? For me, this is almost like a family matter or friend matter. It's a question of trust. I mean, some things you just you just can't say out in the public, but you can. If you have a good relationship, then you can say them directly. And for me, that's not appeasement. Quite the contrary, it's respect or it's using dignified foreign policy. And then sometimes we use the public arena for diplomacy. And it is an extremely important tool in foreign policy, as we can see. I mean, look, the president of the United States uses his truth social as one of the most powerful foreign policy instruments that we have ever seen before. So I'm not denying that. But it doesn't all happen in the public sphere. It can happen in the private one as well. So if I was a student now, I'd be looking at the sort of juncture of these two. Super interesting.
Great. Well, that's all we got time for today. I'm sorry that we couldn't answer all the questions, but if you are still curious, Alex disturbed. The president has just recorded a podcast with me on The world in 30 minutes, so you can hear even more of him there if you want to, to get his other ideas on different topics. But for now, I think this is the end of our session. Maybe you can join me in thanking Alex for a fascinating session.
Thank you.
Thank you for coming.
Okay.